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RECENT CASES
BULs AND NoTEs-NEGOTABImTY OF PRomIssORY Noms-CL-AusS :Fo
TO MAXER AND INDRSERs-Plaintiff, claiming to
be holder in due course of a promissory note, sued the maker thereon. The
note contained a clause: "The makers and endorsers . . . consent to the
renewal and extension of this note without notice to us." The defendant contended that this clause made the note non-negotiable and subject to his equities.
Held, that the note was negotiable.' Siotx Nat. Bank of Siouz City v. Llmdberg, 223 N. W. 826 (S. D. 1929).
A requisite to the negotiability of a promissory note is that it be certain as
to the time when payable.2 Where a note is payable on a fixed daie, with an
option in the maker to pay sooner, the note is negotiable at common law, and
under the N. I.L.' But although there seems to be no valid reason for the distinction, where the holder has the option to accelerate the time of payment, the
majority of courts at common law hold that the note thereby loses its negotiability; I it is generally held that the N. . L. does not abrogate this rule.8 How-

EXTENSION wrrHOUT NOTICE

'Polley, J., wrote a dissenting opinion upon another point in the case.
See Leader v. Plante, g5 Me. 339, 340, 50 Atl. 54 (I.90) ; 2 AMES, LAw
oF BILLS AND NoTEs (x894) 831; I DANIE, NsoTrmBrz INsTRUMENTs (6th
ed. 1913) § 41.
'National Salt Co. v. Ingraham, 143 Fed. 8og (C. C. A. 2d, i9o6) ; Mattison v. Marks, 31 Mich. 421 (1875); i DANIM, op. cit. supr note 2, at 59.
Contra: Hubbard v. Mosley, ii Gray 170 (Mass. 1858). .Similarly, a note is
negotiable where default on interest payments makes whole note due, because
the maker has the option to default or pay. Chicago Ry. Equipment Co. v.
Merchants Bank, 136 U. S. 268, 1o Sup. Ct. Mpg(x890); Commercial Say.
Bank v. Schaffer, 19o Iowa io88, z8i N. W. 492 (I92i). The same rule applies
where default on installments makes whole note due. Star Brewing Co. v.
0Iggins, 248 Mass. 480, 143 N. E. 332 (1924). Cf. Empire Nat. Bank v. High
Grade Oil Refining Co., 26o Pa. 255, IO3 AUt. 6o (1918).
'N. L L. § 4: "An instrument is payable at a determinable future time
within the meaning of this act, which is expressed to be payable: (2) On or
before a fixed or determinable future time specified therein."
ISmith v. Marland, 59 Iowa 645, 13 N. W. 852 (1882) ; First Nat. Bank
of New Windsor v. Blum, 84 N. C. 24 (188z) ; Carroll County Say. Bank v.
Strother, 28 S. C. 5o4 (1886).
Contra: Louisville Banking Co. v. Gray, x23
Ala. 251, 26 So. 207 (1898) (bank, the holder, had option to apply maker's
funds in its hands on the note at any time before maturity) ; Hodges v. Schuler,
22 N. Y. 114 (186o) (holder given option to exchange note at earlier period
for stock in maker corporation); Chafee, Acceteration Provisons ia Time
Paper (i99) 32 HAxv. L. REV. 757, 76i, 774-775; cf. White v. Smith, 77 Ili.
35r (1875)
(note payable on installments as payee demands); Stillvell v.
Craig, 58 Mo. 24 (1874).
'The word "payable" in the N. 1. L. § 4 (2), mpra note 4, is held to apply
only to maker, and therefore the holder is not included because the word
"collectibIe!' is not added. Kimpton v. Studebaker, 14 Idaho 552, 94 Pac. 1039
(I9o8); First Nat Bank of Cheyenne v. Barton, 263 Pac. 142 (Old. 1928),
criticized in (1928) 76 U. oF PA. L. REv. 866; Puget Sound State Bank v.
Paving Co., 94 Wash. 5o4, 162 Pac. 87o (917), approved in (1917) 15 MICH.
(1021)
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ever, when the note provides for extension of time after the maturity date, if
the maker or indorsers or both have the option of extending the maturity date,
the note is obviously bad for uncertainty, because they have the power to extend it ad ijitfitnum and thus totally evade liability to the holder thereof; but an
option in the holder to extend time of payment upon maker's failure to pay at
maturity does not impair the negotiability of the note. A number of courts
take the view that an extension clause, such as found in the principal case, makes
the note non-negotiable on the theory that it renders the time of payment uncertain,8 or gives the makers and indorsers the absolute option to extend the time
of maturity? The majority view is that such clause has no effect other than
to continue the liability of the indorsers after the note is so extended," and that
extension within the meaning of the clause can only occur upon agreement between maker and holder-these parties can agree upon extension in any noteand therefore the note is certain and accordingly negotiable." The latter view,
which was adopted in the principal case, seems preferable, as it is both sound
and practical.

CONDITIONAL SALES-RIGHTS OF CONDITIONAL VENDOR OF CHATTELS TJNDER A IECORDING ACT AS AGAINST SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS OF THE REALTY-

Under a conditional contract of sale, the vendor installed ten steam radiators
in a garage building owned by the vendee. After the conditional contract of
sale had been duly recorded by the vendor, the vendee sold the garage property
to the plaintiff. The vendee then defaulted in his payments of the purchase
price of the radiators. Plaintiff flied a bill to enjoin the vendor from removing
the radiators or froin bringing action at law for their removal. Held, that the
plaintiff was not entitled to the relief asked. Abramsm v. W. W. Pent & Co.,
143 AUt. 795 (Md. Appeals 1928).
In the absence of recording statutes it is generally held that a conditional
vendor of chattels subsequently annexed to realty, cannot establish his title to
chattels so annexed as against a purchaser without notice of the realty 2 However, where the purchaser has actual notice of the conditional sale, he does not
L. R v. 512. Contra: Chafee, op. cit. =pra note 5, at 775, maintaining that
N. L L. covers both makers' and holders' options.
Stitzel v. Miller, 250 Ill. 72, 95 N. E. 53 (1911) ; i DAmIL,op. cit. supra
note 2, at 60; cf. Bank of Whitehouse v. White, 136 Tenn. 634, i9I.S. W. 332
(1917).
'Union Stockyards Nat Bank v. Bolan, 14 Idaho 87, 93 Pac. So8 (igo8);
Rosville State Bank v. Heslet, 84 Kan. 315, 113 Pac. 1052 (1911).

Cedar Rapids Nat. Bank v. Webb, i8o Iowa 966, 164 N. W. 233 (1917).
National Bank of Commerce v. Kenney, 98 Tex. 293, 83 S. W. 368 (1904).
First Nat. Bank v. Buttery, 17 N. D. 326, 116 N. W. 341 (1908).

"Wolfboro L. & B. Co. v. Rollins, 195 Mass. 323, 8i N. E. 204 (1907);
Russel v. Wyant, 214 Mo.App. 377, 253 S. W. 790 (x923); Security Nat Bank
v. Gunderson, 216 N. W. 595 (S. D. 1927); BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRuMENTS LAW (4 th ed. 1926) 87o.

i2TIFFANY, REAL

PROPERTY (2d ed. i92o) 922.
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acquire title to the annexed chattel.' Under recording acts in most jurisdictions
we have the problem of whether the recording of a contract of conditional sale
or of a chattel mortgage, constitutes constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser of the realty. It is conceded that recording does not give such constructive notice where the article sold is so closely incorporated with the realty
that in substance it loses its identity and cannot be severed from the realty
without material injury to itself or to the freehold 5 But where the fixture may
be severed from the realty without causing material injury, there is difference
of opinion. Some jurisdictions hold the act of recording a conditional sale' or
chattel mortgage 5 to be constructive notice to subsequent purchasers of the
realty. Courts so deciding consider the articles in question as never having
ceased to be chattels, even though annexed to the realty, on grounds that such
was the intent of the parties to the contract of sale,' and that the purchaser of
the realty had a duty to examine the records of chattel mortgages and conditional sales, inasmuch as the articles had originally been chattels. Another
line of decisions holds that title to the annexed chattel passes with the realty,
despite the recording of a conditional sale or chattel mortgage8 Such courts
see no reason why a purchaser of the realty should search through the records
of personal property,9 and suggest that the conditional vendor protect himself
by means of a mortgage on the realty, recorded as such 1 Under either view
the purchaser has no notice when the conditional vendor has failed to meet all
IIngersoll v. Barnes, 47 Mich. 104, io N. W. x27 (i88i) ; American Clay
Machinery Co. v. Sedalia Brick Co., 174 Mo. App. 485, i6o S. W. 9oz (1913) ;
Wolf v. Kutch, I47 Wis. 209, 132 N. W. g8i (igIi). The rule also applies
where the conditional sale or chattel mortgage has been recorded. St. Marys
Machine Co. v. lola Mill & Elevator Co., 97 Kans. 464, 155 Pac. xo77 "(1916).
'Allis-Chalmers Co. v. City, 164 Iowa 8, 144 N. W. 346 (1914) ; TniFA-x,
op. cit. supra note i, at 920; UNIFORM CoNDiTioNAL SALEs Acr, § 7. Discussed
in BOGERT, COuMENTARIES ON CONDITIONAL SALES (1924) 98.
'Oil City Boiler Wks. v. N. J. Water Co., 81 N. J. L. 491, 79 AUt. 451
(Igio) ; Lawton Pressed Brick Co. v. Ross-Kellar Brick Co., 33 Okia. 59, 124
Pac. 43 (912) ; Liddell Co. v. Cork, 120 S. C. 48r, X13 S. E. 327 (1922). The
same rule applies to subsequent mortgagees of the realty. Detroit Steel Cooperage Co. v. Sisterville Brewing Co., 233 U. S. 712, 34 Sup. Ct. 753 (1914), and
to trustees of a subsequent trust in the realty. Monarch Laundry Co. v. Westbrook, IO9 Va. 382, 63 S. E. xo7o (i9o9).
5
Sword v. Low, 122 Ill. 487, 13 N. E. 826 (1887); Eaves v. Estes, lo
Kans. 314 (1872) ; Ford v. Cobb, 2o N. Y. 344 (1859).
8
See Sword v. Low, supra note 5, at 496, x3 N. E. at 828; Eaves v. Estes,
supra note 5, at 317.
"See Liddell Co. v. Cork, spre note 4, at 489, 113 S. E. at 330.
8
Tibbetts v. Home, 65 N. H. 242, 23 At. 145 (1889); Brennan & Whitaker, 15 Ohio St. 446 (z864); Phillips v. Newsome, 179 S. W. 1123 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1915); EwE=4 FixTuREs (2d ed. 1905) 485; cf. Sowden v. Craig,
26 Iowa 156 (1868).
9
See Tibbetts v. Home, supra note 8, at 247, 23 AUt. at 147.
20 See Phillips v. Newsome, supra note 8, at 1125; EwEr.;., op. cit. supra
note 8, at 486. It is argued that the real property records would be inaccurate
if such fixtures be considered chattels.
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requirements of the recording statute. Iinthe instant case the subject matter
of the conditional sale had not been annexed to the realty," and inasmuch as the
sale had been recorded, a subsequent purchaser of the realty never acquired
title to the radiators which had not ceased to be chattels.
CoNsTrrumoNAL LAw-AcnILARY PowmS oF CDONGRESS-SENATE IvESTiGATIoNs-The plaintiff, testifying before the Senate committee for investigation of contributions to the political parties during the senatorial elections of
1926,' refused to answer questions concerning the source of his personal contribution which he admitted he had made. Under a Senate resolution a warrant was issued to bring him before the bar of the Senate to answer questions
pertinent to the inquiry. Upon being taken into custody, the plaintiff sued out
a writ of habeas corpus. Held, that his refusal to answer the questions of the
committee was no contempt and that he should be released. U. S. ex rel. C1n-

ninhlam v. Barry, 29 F. (2d) 817 (C.C. A. 3rd, 1928).
Congress has ancillary powers necessary to carry out the powers and
duties conferred upon it by the Constitution.2 So each house has the power to
summon witnesses before it to investigate all facts necessary to an intelligent
accomplishment of its constitutional functions and purposes,' and this power
may be delegated to a committee.' The witnesses may be compelled to appear
and testify by a warrant issued to the sergeant-at-arms of the house.5 If the
witness fails to appear or refuses to testify, proceedings may be instigated by
the house to punish him for contempt,6 but only when his default interferes
with a matter properly before that body for its action. The power of investigation being ancillary to the express powers of Congress, investigation into
the private affairs of a witness would be beyond its jurisdiction, and a refusal
"'Colwell Lead Co. v. Home Title Ins. Co., r54 App. Div. 83; z38 N. Y.
Supp. 738 (1912).
'Nat. Bank v. North, i6o Pa. 303, 28 At. 694 (E894).
In the instant
case the radiators were separate units and could be detached from the supply
pipe without injury to the freehold or to the heating system.
The committee was created by Senate Resolution r95, May 16, 1926.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. I8ig); Legal Tender Case,
no U. S. 412, 4 Sup. Ct. 122 (1883) ; Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U. S.
2

s65, 38 Sup. Ct. 400 (1918).
*In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661, 17 Sup. Ct. 677 (1897) ; see Reed v. County
Com'rs, 21 F. (2d) I44, 147 (E. D. Pa. 1927), af'd 21 F. (2d) iois (C. C. A.

3rd, 1927) ; T CooLEv, CoNsrrruTioAL Lm.TrATioNs (8th ed. 1927) 275.
'Reed v. County Com'rs, supra note 3; Wilckens v. Willet, 4 Abb. Dec.
596 (N. Y. 1864).
5
Wilckens v. Willer supra note 4.
'Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (U. S. 82) ; Stewart v- Blaine, i Mac-

Arth. 453 (D. C. 1874).
'Kilbourn v. Thompson, 193 U. S. 168 (i88o); Marshall v. Gordon, 243

U. S. 521, 37 Sup. Ct 448 (1916), rezJg 235 Fed. 42z (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
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to respond to such an inquiry would not constitute contempt Statutes ' making
criminal a failure to respect a summons of either house do not deprive the
house of its power to punish the offender for contempt: As each house has
the constitutional power' to be the soIe "Judge of the Electioni, Returns, and
"
Qualifications of its own Members, " it would be within its jurisdiction to
compel witnesses to testify as to facts pertinent to the proceeding and to punish
a witness -who refused to so testify.13 Since the inquiry in the instant case
delved into the private financial affairs of the witness, his refusal to testify did
not amount to a contempt 1
CONSTiTUTIONAL LAw-LIcENSE BY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO BuILD STRUCTURE ox NAVIGABLE WATERS AS A DEFENCE To ACTIoN FOR DAMAGES OR

ABATEMENT-The defendant procured a license from the federal Water Power
Commission to install flashboards on a federal dam in order to raise the water
level for use in its private power plant. The water backed up and diminished
the head of water at the mill of the plaintiffs who were upper riparian owners.
There was no evidence to support a. finding that the project was to aid navigation. Held, that the plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction and damages. Little
FallsFibre Co. v. Henry Ford & Son, x64 N. E. 559 (1928).
The federal governmefit may aid navigation under the commerce clause by
regulating the flow of water in navigable waters and when no lands are flooded
it is not a taking of private property and the riparian owner cannot complain
Through its control of navigable waters, the federal government may require
a license before acts are done affecting navigation, or private rights are established 2 Such a license does not have the same effect as an undertaking of the
project by Congress, but is only a condition to the exercise of a right which
8

Kilbourn v. Thompson, Marshall v. Gordon, both supre note 7; see McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. '35, 176, 47 Sup. Ct. 319, 329 (x927). But of.
ex parte Nugent, i8 Fed. Cas. No. io,375 (1848).
0 11 STAT. I55 (857), 12 STAT. 333 (i862), 2 U. S. C. §§ I92-I94 (1928).
I& re Chapman, rupra note 3.
S. CObsTrruTIoN, Art I, Sec. 5, par. 2.
1U.
'State ex rel. Fleming v. Crawford, 28 Fla. 441, io So. ui8 (i8gi) ; State
v. Blaisdell, i8 N. D. 55, 118 N. W. 150 (i9o8) ; State ex rel. McDill v. State
Canvassers, 36 Wis. 498 (1874) ; see in re Voorhis, 291 Fed. 673, 675 (S. D.
N. Y. 1923).
" 3Kilbourn v. Thompson, spra note 7, at 19o.
"The dissent considers the warrant not to be a contempt proceeding, but
merely an exercise of the power of the Senate to compel witnesses to appear and
testify concerning the election of senators.
INew Jersey v. Sargent; 269 U. S. 328, 46 Sup. Ct. =2 (1926) ; Willink v.
U. S., 240 U. S. 572, 36 Sup. Ct. 422 (i916) ; Greenleaf Lumber Co. v. Garrison,

237 U. S. 251, 35 Sup. Ct. 55i (1915).
230 STAT. 1151 (i899), 33 U. S. C. § 4o1 (1928); Economy Light & Power
Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 1u3, 41 Sup. Ct. 409 (1i21) ; United States v.
Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., i74 U. S. 6m0, i9 Sup. Ct. 77o (1899).
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must be established independently of the license;* so that when the act is
within the province of the state to regulate, the fact that it is licensed by the
federal government does not make it any the less subject to regulation. The
use under a license may be forbidden by the states.' The states may make
regulations affecting acts under a coasting license,' a fishing license,* a license
to build structures on navigable waters7 These licenses for private purposes
are mere permissions by the federal government to do acts that come within
the regulation of commerce, and are not grants of authority which cannot be
impaired by the states. As these private rights are acquired subject to the
regulation of the states, it does not seem unusual that the licensees are also
subject to suits in the state courts by individuals who have suffered damage, as
in the principal case.

DIvoRcF-ZEMAPIAGE OF THE WIFE AS AFFECTING AmIONY DECRFE-By
final decree a divorced husband was ordered to make weekly alimony payments
to his wife. Unknown to her ex-husband, the wife remarried. Husband petitioned the court that he be relieved from making further payments and that the
wife refund all payments made subsequent to her remarriage. Held, that the
husband continue to pay alimony until he prove that the wife no longer needs
it to support her in a station in life equal to that of her former husband.
Cropsey v. Cropsey, z Atl. 621 (N. J.1929).
The obligation of a divorced husband to continue to pay alimony to his
wife does not ipso facto cease upon her remarriage.1 Thus, it does not cease
if the decree has been made under an agreement that the husband is to pay during the lifetime of the wile, or where the decree is given to the divorced wife
in lien of her rights in her husband's property,' or in settlement of a debt owed

'International Bridge Co. v. New York, 254 U. S. 126, 41 Sup. Ct 56
Wilson v. Hudson County Water Co., 76 N. J.Eq. 543, 76 Atl. 56o

(x92o);
(I9310).

'License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462 (U. S. 1866); Block v. Trustees of
Jacksonville, 36 Ill.
301 (1865).
'Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, xo7 U. S. 365, 2 Sup. Ct. 257
(1882); Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 (U. S. 1829);
Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713 (U. S. 1865) ; Chilvers v. People, 1i Mich.
43 (1862).
'Manchester v. Mass., 139 U. S. 240, i Sup. Ct 559 (1891), Smith v.
Maryland, I8 How. 71 (U. S.1855).
"Commonwealth v.Penna. P. P. C., 72.Pa. Super. 353 (1919); International Bridge Co. v. New York, Wilson v. Hudson County Water Co., all
supra at note 3.
'Morgan v. Morgan, 2II Ala. 7, 99 So. X85 (1924); Nelson v. Nelson,
Mo. 412, 221 S.W. io66 (ig2o) ; Myers v. Myers, 62 Utah 90, 28 Pac.
(1923). Contra: Carlton v. Carlton, 87 Fla. 46o, ioo So. 745 (1925);
Baker v. Baker, 4 Ohio App. i7o (1Ii5).
2
Newbold v. Newbold, 133 Md. 170, 104 Aft. 366 (i918). Alimony does
cease per se at remarriage of wife if the parties so agree. Lehmann v. Lehmann,
225 Ill.
App. 513 (1922).
' Hogarty v. Hogarty, 188 Cal. 625, 2o6 Pac. 79 (ig2).
282
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to the wife by the husband. However, these situations differ from the ordinary
alimony obligation in that the latter does not arise from a property right or
debt, but is an obligation to support the wife, imposed by law, being 5based on
public policy and the equities growing out of the marital relationship. In the
ordinary alimony situation the husband may move for modification or discontinuance of alimony payments upon the remarriage of his divorced wife.! In
most jurisdictions he is'aided by a presumption that necessity for alimony no
longer exists.7 This places upon the wife the burden of proving that she needs
the alimony. There is difference of opinion on the question of just when this
necessity ceases. The majority of courts hold that there is no longer any need
for alimony if the second husband is able to and does support the wife on a
scale which is adequate support as judged by the general standards of the
community,' although it be in a station of life less pretentious than that which
she formerly occupied. In other courts the need of alimony persists until the
second husband actually supports the wife on the scale to which she was accustomed during her first marriage The decision in the instant case places on
the husband the burden of proving that the wife is actually supported in a
station in life equal to that of her former husband. It would seem that the
better view is to impose upon the wife the burden of proving that she does not
receive from her second husband what is generally considered adequate support
In the matter of selecting a second husband the doctrine of caveat emptor
should apply.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONs-FOREIGN CObim RCE-D-DNIAL OF STATE CoUnRs
To CORPORATION SUING wITHOUT STATE LIcENsE-A New York statute provides that no foreign corporation shall do business in New York unless first
registered and licensed'by the state; and that no suit upon any contract made
in New YorkI can be brought in the state courts by a foreign corporation which'
does not comply with said statute. A foreign corporation which maintained

'Moore v. Moore, 33 Wyo. 230, :237 Pac. 235 (192-5).
'See Phy v. Phy, n16 Ore. 31, 47, 240 Pac. 237, 24o (1925); KEEZER,

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (2d ed. 1923) 480.

'Alimony may cease as to the wife but continue as to the children. Heston
v. Odlin, 125 Wash. 477, 2x6 Pac. 845 (1923).
T
Cohen v. Cohen, i5o Cal. 99, 88 Pac. 267 (ipo6) ; Dietrich v. Dietrich, 99
N. J. Eq. 711, 134 Atl. 338, (1926) ; Phy v. Phy, supra note 5.
'Phy v. Phy, supra note 5; Emerson v. Emerson, 12o Md. 584, 87 Atl.
1033 (1913). These courts reason that the public policy which imposed an
obligation on the first husband no longer exists when the wife has another
husband to support her, though it be in a lower station in life. The selection
of a second husband is a matter of personal choice, and the financial shrewdness
of that selection is a question with which the courts can have no concern.
'Dietrich v. Dietrich, supra note 7. For a discussion of this case see
(1926) 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 179. Such courts contend that the wife is entitled
to a standard of living no lower than her former one, and that it would discourage remarriage by the wife if she were forced to wait for a second husband
as wealthy as her original spouse.
12 CoNsoImzaTE

L ws oF Nnw YonN (igo") ch. 23 § 25.
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an office in New York but was not registered as required, made a contract in
New York insuring a vessel -which it operated in foreign commerce. The
vessel was lost, and on suit being brought for the insurance, the defense was
plaintiff's failure to comply with the statute. Held, that the plaintiff can recover,'as the statute cannot be applied to a transaction essentially a part of
foreign commerce. Ruby Steamship Corp. v. American Merchant Marine
liunrance Co., 224 App. Div 531 (N. Y. 1928).
It is well settled that a state can require that a foreign corporation comply
with licensing statutes as a prerequisite to doing business within its limits?
Such a statute cannot; however, be applied to transactions in interstate or foreign commerce without being an unconstitutional interference therewith; ' and
this is true although the transaction partakes in its nature of both business
within the state and commerce interstate.' Where the statute merely prohibits
suit, as in the present case, it has been held that the contract is good' but the
right of action is suspended until compliance0 In the present case the only
difficulty arises from holding the contract to be a transaction in foreign commerce; insurance contracts, as a rule, being held not to be commerce within
the constitutional provisions. Yet if the insurance be considered an essential
part of the vessel's operation, the holding is justifiable, for a state may not
require compliance with a licensing statute as a condition to doing business in
interstate or foreign commerce.

InTETNAr- RxvENux-Ixcom!E

TAx-DEDucON

FOR

OBSOLESCENCE OF

GooD WiLL-Plaintiff, a. manufacturer and vendor of ale and lager beer until
the Eighteenth Amendnwt went into effect, brought this action to recover income tax money paid under protest, claiming that from January 31, i918, when
it was reasonably apparent that prohibition measures would be enacted, until
January i6, 1920, when the measure became effective, it should be allowed to
deduct from its income the obsolescence of its good will caused by such legislation. Held, that under the Revenue Act of 1918 such deduction is proper and
2

Paul v. Virginia, 75 U. S. 168 (1868); Commonwealth v. New York,
L. E., & W. R. Co., 129 Pa. 463 (i889).
I Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 42 Sup. Ct. io6 (i92I);
People v. Wemple, 13i N. Y. 64, 29 N. E. ioo2 (1892); Herman Bros. v.
Nasiacos, 46 Colo. 2o8 (igo9).

'Gunn v. White Sewing Machine Co., 57 Ark. 4 (1892) ; U. S. Gypsum
Co. v. Gleason, 135 Wisc. 539 (ISo8).
IThe cases are in absolute conflict as to whether such a contract is void
unless expressly so declared in the statute. Note (19o6) I L. R. A. (ir. s.)
IO4i;.Note (1894) 24 L. R. A. 315.
0
Kirven v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 145 Fed. 288 (C. C. A. 4th,
I900); National Fertilizer Co. v. Fall River Savings Bank, 196 Mass. 458, 8z
N. E. 671 (i9o7). The federa courts will entertain the action without any
compliance, Blodgett v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 12o Fed. 893 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o3).
"Paul v. Virginia, supra note 2; Hooper v. California, 1S5 U. S. 648, is
Sup. Ct. 207 (1894).
ICrutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, ii Sup. Ct. 851 (i89i) ; International
Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 9r, 30 Sup. Ct. 481 (0909).
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should be allowed. Haberle Crystal Sprinzgs Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 30 F. (2d)
219 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).

This decision is contra to the first case deciding this point, Red Wig
Mailing Co. v. Willcuts, -which was followed in a later decision.2 The Red
Wing case lays great stress on the actual wording of the statute,* especially on
the word "including." The court therein decided that the last phrase names an
additional element which will be considered in the deduction allowed on property used in the business and subject to wear and tear, but that it does not
establish an entirely different and separate ground for deduction, as an allowance for obsolescence of good will would be. The Court differentiates good
will and other intangible assets on the ground that good will can not be sold
separately from the business. The principal case does not find "including" such
a stumbling block and says that since deductions are allowed for the obsolescence
of other intangibles, as patents,' leases,' and contracts,' there is no reason for
distinguishing between these and good will.y In so deciding the court reaches
the sane and just conclusion; for good will is one of the most important assets
of any business and figures largely in the price when the business is bought or
sold, so that when the limit of its existence can be fixed with reasonable certainty a deduction for its obsolescence should be allowed as in the case of other
intangibles. The principal case shows that this result can be reached under the
statute, and the fact that good will can not be sold separately from the business
does not prevent its obsolescence nor present- a valid reason for not allowing a.
deduction for this loss!
1I5 F. (2i) 626 (C. C. A. 8th, z926), 49 A. L. R. 459 (1927).
Landsberger v.McLaughlin, 26 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928), which
gives as one reason that good will is not property used in the business.
2

24O

STAT. 1077 (1919), 26 U. S. C. § 986 (1926), which allows a deduction

for "wear and tear of property used in the trade or business, including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence."
'Van Kannel Revolving Door Co. v. Commissioner, xi B. T. A. 1209
(1928).

'Philip Henrici Co. v. Reinecke, 3 F. (2d) 34 (N. D. Ill. 924) ; Kaufman-Straus Co. v. Lucas, 12 F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926). But ef. Wiener
v. Weiss, z7 F. (2d) 65o (N. D. Ohio 1927), where the deduction was not
allowed because the lessee had a ninety-nine year lease, renewable forever, and
had no capital invested. The only deductions allowed were the amount paid
for rent and repairs.
'Kentucky Tobacco Products Co. v. Lucas, 5 F. (2d) 723 (W. D. Ky.
1925); see Lassen Lumber and Box Co. v. Blair, 27 F. (2d) 17 (C. C. A. 9th,
1928).

7The decision would seem to be in accord with the Treasury rule, Article
163, Regulations 45 (1920 Ed.), " . . . If, however, an intangible asset
acquired through capital outlay is known from experience to be of value in the
business for only a limited period, the length of which can be estimated from
experience with reasonable certainty, such intangible asset may be the subject
of a depreciation allowance,

.

.

'For a very complete note on the subject of losses generally see, Note
(i92r)

zz A. L. R. Soo.
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INTEIkNATIONAL LAw-ABRoGATION oF TR ATis By WAR nrwzwm CoxlNATioNs-On October 23, 1917, X died, intestate and seized of land

mACTxNG

in Nebraska, leaving non-resident German aliens as his heirs-at-law. By treaty
between Germany and the United States,' citizens of both nations were exempt
from local provisions preventing aliens from inheriting land. The defendants
seek to vacate sale of this land on the ground that the war between Germany and
the United States abrogated the treaty, and accordingly X's relatives did not
receive title thereto. Held, that the treaty was still in force. Goos v. Brocks,
223 N. W. 13 (Neb. 192q).

At common law all aliens were incapable of inheriting land;- and resident
alien enemies were even subject to personal arrest and forfeiture of their
goods 3 Most nations have negotiated treaties with the United States to provide
their citizens with immunity from these harsh rules. Should war abrogate such
treaties? There is wide variance of opinion upon this problem.' The older
writers adopted the view that war ipso facto culminated all treates. Modern
authorities agree that war absolves treaties of alliance, and those relating to
trade and commerce,8 because they are incompatible with the existence of a
state of wary But they maintain that there are treaties which must survive
war, for example, those whose object it is to dictate a nation's conduct in
warfare; for contemplation of a state of hostility between the contracting parties
was the sole reason for the drafting thereof 8 Other treaties, because of their
permanent character, should not be affected by temporary belligerence, i. e.,
1

Treaty with Prussia, concluded May, 1828, 8 STAT. 384 (1848) art. XIV;

treaty with Hamburg, concluded Dec. 2o, 1827, 8 STAT. 370 (1848) art. VII;
treaty with the German :Empire, concluded Dec. ii, 187I, 17 STAT. 926 (1873)
art. X.
I Orser v. Hoag, 3 I-ill 79 (N. Y. i842) ; see Hauenstein v. Lynham, ioo
U. S. 483, 484 (1879) ; I BL. COMM. * 372, et -Seq.; I POL.OCc & MAITLAND,
HIstoRy op ENG. LAW (18.95) 442, et. .eq. However, aliens could take land by
purchase or gift and hold it until office was found. Ibid.
12 WEsTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1913) 44.
For later develop-

meant of the law see Wells v. Williams,

Id. Raym. 282 (1697) ; Sparenburg v.

Bannatyne, I Bos. & P. 163 (1797) ; Schaffenius v. Goldberg, [igi6] T K. B. 24
'2 OPPENHEIm, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1912) § 99; STOCKTON, OUT-

LISF.S OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (914)
265; Moore, Effect of War on Public
Debts and on Treaties (igoi) i Cor. L. REv. 2o9, :216.
53 PHiLLroRE, ImTRNATONAL LAW (3d ed. I885) 794, et seq. For brief
summary of nations' views on treaties in the past century see I-Al., INxTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed. 1924) § 125.
8

IHALLEcx, INTERNATIONAL LAW

( 4 th ed. xqo8)

314-315; 2 OPPENHErm,

op. ct. s, pra note 4, at i3O. However, where the treaty was made with reference to aliens' retiring, with their goods, the treaty is not abrogated. W EAToN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. i916) 377.
7 1 KZNr, COMMENTARIES (sth ed. 1844) 175, e! seq. In Techt v. Hughes,
229 N. Y. 2=, 2 i, 128 X. E. 185, 191 (lg2o), Cardozo, J., propounds the following rule "provisions compatible with a state of hostilities, unless expressly
terminated, will be enforced, and those incompatible rejected. 'Treaties lose their
efficacy in war only if their execution is incompatible with war. . .
Bluntschli, Droit International Codifici6, sec. 538:'
8
LA wRwcE, ITERNATIONAL LA, (sth ed. 1913) 364; STocKrTox, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 264; 2 WESTLAKE, Op. cit. mtpraL note 3, at 32.

RECENT CASES
those of boundary, cession, recognition of independence; 0 also those arranged
with other powers, apart from or in common with the enemy. ' Finally, certain
treaties affect primarily the private rights of individual members of the op.posing nations, one of which is an alien's right to inherit property. It is
generally conceded that these treaties may be suspended or abrogated at the
option of the sovereign." The court, in the principal case, proceeded upon
the theory that it is the duty, not of the judicial, but of the executive and
legislative departments of the government to exercise this option, and until
that occurs the court must consider the treaty in full force. This seems both
sound and practical, for war does not necessitate the escheating of aliens' property, except in dire extremity, whereupon the President and Congress may act,
and protection of aliens' property in the United States should guaranty like
solicitude for the interests of American citizens in the enemy country'

INTOXICATxG LiQuoas-Fon-Errua oF VEnIcLE-RIG S OF LIENnoLDERS
-An automobile was condemned and sold as a public nuisance for having been
used for the illegal transportation of intoxicants. The enabling statute of
Texas' makes no provision for the disposition of the interests of lienholders.
Held, that the proceeds of the sale are subject to the claim of a conditional
vendor who had no notice of the use to which the auto was being put. General
Motors AeceptawZe Corporationv. State, 32 S. W. (2d) 968 (Tex. iz29).
In a similar proceeding under the Alabama statute which authorizes condemnation only of the interests of those persons who assisted in the illegal
transaction or who had notice thereof,' it appeared that a. conditional vendor
had investigated the conditional vendee's moral character and court record but
that the vendee had a reputation for bootlegging and that he carried on illegal
transactions near the vendor's place of business. Held, that the conditional
vendor's interest may be forfeited in the condemnation proceedings. Peoples'
Anto. Co. v. State, II9 So. 662 (Ala. 1929).
It is well settled that the state in the exercise of its police power may condermi the instrumentalities employed in the violation of its laws; that being a
9:z OPPniNmm, loc. cit. sapra note 6; HALLEcic, loc. cit. srq'ra. note 6:
I-ALL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 457-458.
" LA-wRNCE, op. cit. sitpra note 8, § 144; HALL, op. cit. supra; note 5, at
456-457.
" Society for Propagation of Gospel v. Town of New Haven, 8 Wheat.
464 (U. S. 183) ; Sutton v. Sutton, i Russ. & M. 663 (i83o) ; MOORE,DIGEsT
oF INTERNATioNAr. LA~w (iqo6) 372.
1 Techt v. Hughes, sutpra note 7; State v. Reardon, i2o Kan. 614, 245 Pac.
I8 (926).
Of course the proceeds from sale of the property would not be
transferred to the belligerent nation until the close of the war, but would be
retained by the commission for the protection of aliens' property during, the
war, Birge-Forbes Co. v. Heye, supra note 3.
'See Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch o9, i28-2q9 (U. S.I814).
TEx. Rnv. Crv. STAT. (1925), art. 5im.
'ATA. CRIM. CODE (1923), § 4778.
12
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reasonable method of preventing further infractions. It is no taking without
due process to confiscate even the interest in the chattel of a party who himself is without guilt' (The common law of deodand embodied a somewhat
analogous rule.) I The Revenue Act of 18661 which broadly provides for the
forfeiture of all vehicles used to remove or conceal goods in order to, fraudulently avoid taxation, has been interpreted to operate without regard for the
rights of innocent property interests. These proceedings have come to be
thought of as civil actions strictly h; rem.? The legislatures of many jurisdictions, however, have found it a needless hardship to deprive innocent lienholders
of their rights in the condemned property, and have excepted their interests
from the operation of the forfeiture statutes, provided good cause is shown.
The National Prohibition Act for example, provides for the payment of all
bona fide liens created without the lienor having notice of the existing or proposed illegal use of the vehicle.' A number of state statutes incorporate similar
provisions." Under such enactments, of course, knowledge or notice to the
lienholder of the unlawful use destroys his right to object to forfeiture.
Peoples' Auto. Co. v. State is a case which falls within the last rule. The
states having statutes which make no specific mention of innocent lienholders
have divided on the question whether his interest should be protected. A few
such states take the view that the statute, being remedial, should be construed
liberally and all douBts resolved in favor of the government even though that
construction works hardship." The more generally accepted and more sensible
interpretation is that the lienholder is p~otected because the statute, being penal,
must be strictly construed. 3 General .MotorsAcceptance Corporation v.State
is a case following that view. One state has gone so far in the other direction
as to declare by statute that no property rights of any kind shall exist in contraband liquor or vehicles, thereby clearly depriving lienholders of all protection
however innocent they may be"
I Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499 (894).

'Dobbins's Distillery v. U. S., 96 U. S. 395 (1877); Goldsmith-Grant Co.
v. U. S., 254 U. S.505, 41 Sup. Ct. z89 (920).
r HoLmEs, ComMioN LAW (1881) 7-ii, i7-25; I Br. Commr. 299.
'Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. U. S., spra,note 4. "The thing is the offender."
Cf. Buchholz v. Commonwealth, 127 Va. 794, 1O7 S.E. 76o (1920).
I See (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. R,_v. 615. But see Boyd v. U. S., i6 U. S.
616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (1885).
841 STAT. 35 (1919), 27 U. S. C. § 40 (1926).
U. S. v. Brockley, 266 Fed. iooi (D. C. Pa. 1920) (owner) ; The Saxon,
269 Fed. 639 (D. C. S. Car. 1921) ; see notes (1925) 74 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 170,

(1927)

47 A. L. R.1[055.

10In re Gattina,

203 Ala. 517, 84 So. 760 (1919) ; People v. One Studebaker
Auto, 71 Cal. App. 134, 234 Pac. 856 (1925) ; State v. Hall, 91 W. Va. 648, 114
S. E. 25o (1922) ; note (1927) 25 MicH. L. Rav. 659.

1 Pittsburg Taxicab Co. v. U. S., 281 Fed. 669 (C. C. A. 6th, i922);
Lummus v. Hopkins, 31 Ga. App. 274, 120 S. R. 546 (I923).
'Van Oster v.XKansas, 272-U. S. 465, 47 Sup. Ct. 1.33 (1926) ; same case,
19

Kan. 874, 241 Pac. 112 (1925).

" Hoover v. People, 68 Colo. 249, 187 Pac. 531 (I92) ; State v. Rose, 132
AtI. 864 (Del. 1926); note (IYgo) 34 HARv. L. REv. 200.
'White Auto Co. v. Collins, 136 Ark. 81, 2o6 S. W. 748 (1918).
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PRINCIPAL AND SuRETY-DIscHARGE OF THE SUlTY-STATUTE OF Limr TATioNS-The plaintiff had assigned and delivered securities to the payee of
notes of a third party as collateral therefor. The statute of limitations having
barred the notes, the plaintiff brings this bill to enjoin the sale of the collateral
by the holder and to compel him to return the same. Held, that the plaintiff is
not entitled to the relief. Weems v. Carter, 30 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 4th,
1929).
One who provides collateral security for the debt of another is in the position of surety upon that obligation? Generally the liability of the surety is
measured by2 and depends upon' the liability of the principal. Any act of the
creditor discharging the principal releases the surety.' But if the principal is
released by operation of law, the surety is not thereby relieved of liability;' so
if the statute of limitations bars the debt of the principal, the liability of the
surety is not terminated thereby.

To release the surety, the statute must run

as to his obligation as well,7 beginning at the time he becomes liable to suit.
If the contract of suretyship is in the nature of a joint obligation with the
principal, the statute would release the two simultaneously, unless a different
period should apply to each obligor? If the surety guarantees collectibility of
the principal debt, an actual suit by the creditor against the principal and an
unsatisfied execution under judgment therein is generally implied as a condition
precedent to the creation of the liability of the surety. 0 So, if the action of
the creditor against the principal were barred, the liability of the surety could

'O'Conor v. Morse, 112 Cal. 3r, 44 Pac. 305 (1896); Eberhart v. EyreShoemaker, Inc., 78 Ind. App. 658, 134 N. E. 227 (1922).
2 See Peay v. Southern Surety Co. 141 Ark. 265, 273, 216 S. W. 722, 725

(i919) ; Rafferty v. Klein, 256 Pa. 48r, 486, oo At. 945, 947 (1917).
'Eising v. Andrews, 66 Conn. 58, 33 Atl. 585 (1895).
"Gage v. Cassidy, 23 How. 109 (U. S. 1859) ; Lamb v. Wahlemnaier, r44
Cal. 91, 77 Pac. 765 (1904).
5
See James v. Plank, r59 I1. App. 293, 29 (I9O) ; Michener v. Springfield
Co., 142 Ind. 130, 135, 40 N. E. 679, 68 (1896). Discharge in bankruptcy does
not relieve the surety. Wolfboro Loan Co. v. Rollins, 195 Mass. 323, 8r N. E.
204 (19o7). Nor will coverture or infancy of the principal. See Gates v.
Tebbetts, 83 Neb. 573, 576, i9 N. W. 1120, 1121 (19o9). Cf. Stanhope v.
Shanbow, 54 Mont. 360, I7O Pac. 752 (i918). Nor insanity of the principal.
Burner v. Nutter, 77 W. Va. 256, 87 S. E. 359 (igS).
IJohnson v. Machinery Co., 104 Miss. 217, 61 So. 178 (1913); Eikhoff v.
Eisenbarry, 52 Neb. 332, 72 N. W. 309 (I897); Charbonneau v. Bouvet; 98
Tex. 167, 82 S.W. 46o (1904). Contra: Bernd v. Lynes, 71 Conn. 733, 43 Atl.
i89 (1899) ; Auchampaugh v. Schmidt, 70 Iowa 642, 27 N. W. 803 (886) ; see
Willis v. Chowning, 9o Tex. 617, 6=z, 40 S.W. 395, 397 (i897) for a criticism
of this view.
'Manson v. Rawlings, 112 Va. 384, 71 S.E. 564 (i9i).
'Newell v. Clark, 73 N. H. 289, 6i Atl. 555 (i9o5) ; see Russell v. Garrett,
2o4 Ala. 98, ioi, 85 So. 42o, 423 (i92o).
"James v. Plank, z59 I1. App. 293 (igio); Charboneau v. Bouvet, supra
note 6.
1
0Craig v. Parkes, 40 N. Y. 183 (1869) ; Jenkins v. Wilkinson, xo7 N. C.
707, 709, 12 S.E. 630, 630 (i89o) ; Wilkinson-Gaddis Ce. v. Van Riper, 63 N. J.

L. 394, 397, 43 AtI. 675, 676 (x899).
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never arise." If the contract is a guaranty of payment of the principal debt, the
liability of the surety arises upon the failure of the principal to pay the debt'
The creditor need not proceed first against the principal; ' the statute would
begin to run against the obligation of the principal and that of the surety at one
time"' and would bar them simultaneously, unless each of them is of a different
legal nature to which the statute would apply unequal periods. As the contract
of the plaintiff in the instant case appears, in the absence of evidence giving a
different explanation of the transaction, to be a guaranty of payment of the
notes, it would seem that the statutory period for the two obligations should
elapse simultaneously. Generally, however, a creditor may proceed against
collateral security even though the statute has barred the original debt, but
not if such proceedings are also barred 1 ' Although the recovery on the notes
is barred, the payee to whom collateral security has been pledged for the notes
nevertheless should be entitled to retain the security until the notes are paid'
Even though the defendasit were not entitled to retain the collateral provided
by the plaintiff, the instant case might still be supported on the ground that the
statute of limitations can only be a matter of defence and never a cause of
action' as here advanced by the plaintiff.

REmEDIES-STATE WomrmEn's

CoPExNsATioN LAW AS APPL ED TO HAit-

Bon Wonxmts AND LoNGsuoRtx-Complainant, a stevedore in the employ of
the respondent, was injured in the course of his employ upon the deck of a
vessel moored at a wharf on the navigable waters of Narragansett Bay. After
the accident the parties agreed that bills for medical and hospital service, as
well as compensation for partial incapacity, should be paid by the respondent
as provided in the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Rhode Island.
Complainant sues in equity to specifically enforce this agreement. Held, that
'See Pfeiffer v. Crossley, 91 N. J. L. 433, 434, 103 Ati. iooo, ioo (igx8).
But if non-collectibility may be evidenced by the statutory bar, the liability of
the surety would arise upon the barring of the principal obligation. See the
dissenting opinion in Craig v. Parkes, supra: note io, for the view that noncollectibility may be evidenced by other circumstances than a judgment and
unsatisfied execution against the principal.
I Columbia Supply Co. v. Kemmett, 67 N. J. L. 18, So Atl. 663 (igoi) ; see
Cowan v. Roberts, 134 N. C. 415, 418, 46 S. E. 979, 980 (19o4)Treweek v. Howard, 1o5 Cal. 434, 39 Pac. 2o (1895); see Campbell v.
Sherman, 151 Pa. 70, 73, 25 Atl. 35, 36 (1892).
i
" Rawleigh Medical Co. v. Atvater, 33 Idaho 399, 195 Pac. 545 (19
2i ) (by

inference).
' Townsend v. Tyndale, 16s Mass. 293, 43 N. E. io7 (1896); Menzel v.
Hinton, 132 N. C. 66o, 44 S. E. 385 (1903) ; see Hartranft's Estate, 153 Pa.
530, 533, 26 At. 104, 105 (1893). Contra: People v. Putnam, 5z Colo. 517, 122
Pac. 796 (19IZ) ; McCracken County v. Trust Co., 84 Ky. 344, I S. W. 595
(1886).
10
See Conway v. Caswell, 121 Ga. 254, 258, 48 S.E. 956, 958 (1904).
'Sav.

Union Bank Co. v. Crowley, 176 Cal. 543, 69 Pac. 67 (1917).

'Talbot v. Hill, 261 Fed. 244 (App. D. C. 1919); Koerner v. Apple, i2o
Misc. 266, 199 N. Y. Supp. 171 ('919), aff'd, 214 App. Div. 716, 2o9 N. Y.
Supp. 861 (1925).

RECENT CASES
the complainant had an adequate remedy at law under the general maritime
law and Acts of Congress, although the state Compensation Act did not apply.
Duffy v. Provdeime Teaming Co., 144 At. zo6 (R. L 1929).
Under the federal Constitution 1 all cases of admiralty jurisdiction are
within the judicial power of the United States, with authority in Congress to
make laws necessary to carry into execution such judicial power. Under the
Judiciary Act* Congress placed in the United States District Court exclusive
original cognizance of admiralty causes, "saving to suitors in all cases, the
right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give
This legislation places contracts of employment to load and unload
it.!"
vessels upon navigable waters, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal
courts, to be governed by admiralty law,' inasmuch as such contracts" and
injuries suffered in the course of such employment' are of a maritime nature.
However, attempts were made to subject longshoremen's contracts of employment to the provisions of state workmen's compensation statutes, on grounds
that the "saving clause' of the Act of 1789 reserved to suitors such common
law remedy. The United States Supreme Court held that state compensation
statutes could not be invoked7 because longshoremen work in a maritime
locality. Congress then sought by legislative enactment 8 to extend the "saving
clause" in order to include such state statutes. But this attempted extension
was held unconstitutional," on grounds that it would tend to destroy harmony
and uniformity in maritime law.. Congress passed another act"' which confined the state remedy to local harbor workers, by excepting masters and crews
of vessels. Despite this alteration, the act was again declared unconstitutional n
on grounds that the matter was of national concern, demanding a uniform
2

U. S. CoNsTrruvlox, Art. III, Sec. 3.
1ISTAT. 77 (789).
The courts are careful in distinguishing a common law remedy and. a
common law right when construing this provision: Chelentis v. Luckenback
S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372, 38 Sup. Ct. 5oz (i9x8). State courts have jurisdiction
concurrently with federal courts to enforce a right established by the Merchant
Marine Act. Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S.33, 46 Sup. Ct. 410 (3926).
'Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, 34 Sup. Ct. 733 (1914)_
'The Osceola, 189 U. S. X58, 23 Sup. Ct. 483 (1902).
"Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, .stpranote 4.
7
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524 (1917).
(Holmes, Pitney, Brandeis, and Clarke, JJ., dissenting.) The court reasoned
that the Constitution entrusted the uniformity and harmony of the maritime
law to Congress, and that the power to legislate in maritime matters could not
be delegated to the states, since the variant legislation of the states would
destroy the uniformity of maritime law.
840 STAT. 395 (1i7), 27 U. S. C. § 41 (3)

(1925).

The act added the

clause: "and to claimants the rights and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Law of any state."
9IKnickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 40 Sup. Ct. 438 (1920).
Holmes, Pitney, Brandeis, and Clarke, JJ., dissenting. For a discussion of the
constitutionality of this act, see i B.nirci', ON AD MI TY (5th ed. 1925) 39.
"'42 STAT. 634 (1922), 28 U. S. C. § 4' (3)

(1925).

' State of Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S.213, 44 Sup. Ct. 302
(xg24). Brandeis, J., dissenting.
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federal compensation statute, rather than diverse and conflicting state statutes.
Finally Congress passed the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act,= covering workers engaged in maritime employment on navigable
waters. The constitutionality of this act has yet to be tested, but in all likelihood it will be upheldI inasmuch as it places compensation in the hands of a
federal instead of a state body. In the instant case, the court properly held
that the state statute did not apply, referring the complainant to his remedy
under general maritime law or the new federal Compensation Act if that act be
construed to cover the situation?'

SALEs--WARANTIss--ExPnss WARANTiEs IN

PENzs, vANA-The de-

fendant vendor, in the course of negotiating with the plaintiff for a sale of rubber tires, stated that its tires would average "more mileage than other good
tires." The sale was made, and, the tires giving less mileage than other good
tires, the plaintiff sues for damages for breach of the defendant's alleged
warranty. Held, that the statement was a mere expression of opinion and
therefore no ground for a warranty. Michelin Tire Co. v. Schutz, 295 Pa.
141 (1929).

An expression of opinion cannot support a warranty--either at the common-law,' or under the Sales Act.= It is believed that the court in the principal case properly classed the defendants words as a statement of this sort.
But in their opinion the court, by way of dictim, made an assertion which
justifies comment. The naked averment of a fact, said the court, is not a warranty. The observation was -based upon the case of McFarland v. Newman,'
the classical expositor of the Pennsylvania common-law doctrine, requiring for
every express warranty proof that the vendor actually, and not constructively,
consented to be bound for the truth of his representation
The vast majority
of states differed from Pennsylvania on this point and regarded any positive
affirmation of fact made by the vendor, inducing the sale and relied upon by
the vendee, as an express warranty
The Sales Act codified the majority
244 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U. S. C., C. 18 (1927).
' Stumberg, Harbor Workers and Workmen!s Compensation (1929) 7
Tmx. L. Rnv. 214.

" For a discussion of this Act and its relation to the general problem see
Conlen, Ten Years of the Jensen Case (928) 76 U. oF PA. L. Rnv. 926.
'Armstrong v. Descalzi, 48 Pa. Super. 171, 18o
SUNiFoRm SAxEs Acr § 12.

(19I).

'At page x44.

19 Watts 55, 34 Am. Dec. 497 (Pa. 1839).

The English view is in accord,

Heilbert Symons & Co. v. Buckleton, [1913] A. C. ii,

Comment (1913)

61

U. oF PA. L. REv. 619.
5McFarland v. Newman, supra note 4; Wetherill v. Neilson, 20 Pa. 448,
59 Am. Dec. 741 (1853) ; Holmes v. Tyson, 147 Pa. 305, 23 At. 564 (1892).
6
Smith v. Borden, z6o Ind. 223, 66 N. E. 68I (19o3); Hawkins v. Pemberton 51 N. Y. 198, 1o Am. Rep. 595 (1872).
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view," and by its adoption in Pennsylvania in izi5' it would seem that the
common-law rule of that state had been abrogated. Yet in 1919 the superior
court decided a case under the old law,--the Sales Act, however, not being
called to the court's attention. A few years later the supreme court specifically
applied the Sales Act in holding a vendor liable on an express warranty based
upon a statement which the court regarded as a bare affirmation," and the
superior court subsequently adopted this view.' While there is no decision
expressly declaring that the common-law view in Pennsylvania has been
changed by the Sales Act, these cases, it would seem, lead to the conclusion
that section 12 is to be interpreted in this state as it is elsewhere "--namely,
according to its rather obvious meaning. The dictum in the principal case is
interesting as an indication of the persistent influence which a court's earlier
decisions exert upon it, but there is little probability that the doctrine which it
casually embraces will be revived in Pennsylvania in any case in which section
12 of the Sales Act is properly considered by the court.
I § 12, "Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the
goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or
promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases
the goods relying thereon . .
"Act of i915, P. L. 543, PA. STAT. (West, Ig2o) § z966o.
'Walker v. Kirk, 72 Pa. Super. 534 (ipIp), in which the vendor said:
"The horse is sound and all right and a good worker double." This case led
Prof. Bogert to say: "This doctrine seems likely to prevail in Pennsylvania,
notwithstanding the adoption of the Sales Act." Express Warranties in Sales
of Goods, (923) 33 YAn L. J.14, 25.
" Montgomery Co. v. Hal, 282 Pa. 2r2, 127 Atl. 633 (1925). The statement was to the effect that the machine to be furnished to the vendee would be
fitted with an attachment which "will allow us to mill taper threads in pipe
flanges." It is to be noted that the goods which were the subject of the contract were non-specific, and that the words quoted seem, therefore, to be indicative of a condition of the contract rather than of an express warrant.
" Yonker v. Vaneer, 91 Pa. Super. r52 (x927).
""It has been intimated in a recent case that the question is still an open
one in Pennsylvania; Rothermel v. Phillips, 292 Pa. 37, 375, 14 Atl. 241, 243
(1928), where the court said, "Whether this recognized rule in Pennsylvania
has been modified by the first portion of section 12 . . . need not here be
considered."
"Rittenhouse Co. v. Kissner, 129 Md. io-, 98 Atl. 361 (1916) ; Ireland v.
Liggett Co., 243 Mass. 243, 137 N. E. 371 (1922); Worden v. Peck, 245 Mich.
237, 222 N. IV. iOi (1928). See I WxLiSTox, SALES (2d ed. Iz4) § 194.
" I WILLsToN, op. cit. supra note 11, § 199.

